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Why	a	clear,	confident	espousal	of	soft	Brexit	is	less
risky	than	Labour	fears
The	vast	majority	of	Labour	MPs	would	personally	prefer	to	stay	in	the	Single	Market	–	but	the
party	appears	to	be	committed	to	leaving	it,	chiefly	on	the	basis	that	voters	want	to	curb
immigration.	Rob	Johns	(University	of	Essex)	highlights	three	concepts	from	voting	research	–
the	median	voter,	issue	ownership,	and	valence	–	that	offer	the	Labour	party	a	rationale	for
embracing	a	softer	Brexit.
Neither	Her	Majesty’s	Government	nor	Her	Majesty’s	Most	Loyal	Opposition	seems	able	to	offer
Her	Majesty	or	anyone	else	a	coherent	line	on	Brexit.	Yet	the	splits	that	seem	to	preclude	coherence	differ	across	the
two	parties.	The	Conservative	divide	cuts	roughly	down	the	middle	of	the	parliamentary	party.	By	contrast,	the
overwhelming	majority	of	Labour	MPs	voted	Remain	and,	even	if	now	resigned	to	Brexit,	would	ideally	prefer	it	very
soft.	Granted,	the	fact	that	Labour’s	skinny	Eurosceptic	rump	includes	its	leader	and	his	Shadow	Chancellor	does
complicate	matters.	Still,	the	key	Labour	split	is	between	its	MPs	and	its	voters	–	or,	rather,	between	what	its	MPs
want	and	what	they	think	potential	Labour	voters	will	accept.
Shadow	chancellor	John	McDonnell	marches	with	striking	Serco	workers,	July	2017.	Photo:
Steve	Eason	via	a	CC-BY-NC-2.0	licence
There	is	not	much	psephology	can	do	for	the	Conservatives	here.		However,	a	brief	introduction	to	three	key
concepts	from	voting	research	could	prove	useful	for	Labour.	This	free	online	course	is	targeted	especially	at	Labour
MPs	who	would	personally	welcome	something	like	the	Norway	option,	but	fear	that	voters	will	demand	something
altogether	more	Canadian.	The	message	attentive	students	will	take	home	is	that	a	clear,	confident	espousal	of	soft
Brexit	is	less	of	an	electoral	risk	than	they	fear.
1.	 The	median	voter
Suppose	that	everybody	who	voted	in	the	2016	referendum	were	to	form	a	huge	line	in	strict	order.		It	would	start	(in
North	London,	for	convenience)	with	the	most	avidly	pro-Remain	and	end	(in	Skegness)	with	the	most	ardently	pro-
Brexit.		Exactly	halfway	along	that	line	(marooned	somewhere	just	off	the	A1)	stands	the	median	voter.
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We	know	from	the	referendum	result	that	that	median	voter	chose	Leave.		We	also	know,	however,	from	the	52%-
48%	margin	that	he	or	she	is	not	so	distant	from	plenty	of	Remainers	–	indeed,	may	even	have	considered	voting
that	way.		If	Brexit	options	are	measured	on	a	kind	of	Mohs	scale,	the	median	voter	is	right	at	the	soft	end.	
Translated	into	country	examples,	the	median	voter	is	closer	to	Norway	or	Switzerland	than	to	Canada.		None	of	this
is	to	dispute	(as	some	disingenuous	Remainers	tend	to)	that	most	Leave	voters	believed	Brexit	meant	leaving	the
single	market	–	and	regarded	that	as	a	price	worth	paying.	Most	did,	and	still	do.	The	point	here	is	that	the	median
voter,	much	closer	to	Remain	than	was	the	average	Leaver,	is	also	likely	to	be	comfortable	with	a	Brexit	option	more
similar	to	remaining	in	the	EU.
Who	cares	what	the	median	voter	thinks?		For	one	thing,	there	is	a	long	tradition	in	the	study	of	politics	of	treating
them	as	representing	the	popular	will.		Imagine	that	the	referendum	had	gone	the	other	way,	but	by	the	same
margin.		Given	how	openly	the	electorate	had	flirted	with	leaving,	there	would	be	no	mandate	whatsoever	for	further
integration	–	if	anything,	the	mandate	would	be	for	more	like	the	kind	of	‘special	status’	sought	by	David	Cameron	in
his	renegotiation.	On	this	account,	the	Norway	option	is	no	betrayal	of	the	‘will	of	the	people’.		It	may	be	as	accurate
an	expression	of	it	as	an	in/out	referendum	allowed.
However,	this	is	not	mainly	about	salving	Labour	MPs’	democratic	consciences.		For	what	should	be	obvious
reasons,	hovering	around	the	median	voter	is	generally	a	good	place	to	be	electorally.		Of	course,	as	careful	British
Election	Study	analysis	shows,	moving	in	either	direction	on	Brexit	would	win	Labour	some	votes	and	lose	them
others.		But	the	median	voter	is	a	good	place	to	be	–	and	is	closer	to	most	Labour	MPs	than	many	of	them	seem	to
think.
2.	 Issue	ownership
The	obvious	riposte	to	all	this	is	one	word:
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Since	immigration	was	so	central	to	Leave	voters’	concerns,	it	might	seem	suicidal	to	back	a	Brexit	option	that	does
not	restore	UK	control	over	its	EU	borders.	Certainly,	Norway	is	not	an	obvious	stopover	if	Labour’s	final	destination
is	to	win	over	those	voters	for	whom	reducing	immigration	is	the	overriding	political	priority.		But	is	that	feasible
anyway?	It	would	involve	Labour	being	regarded	as	more	willing	and	able	than	the	Conservatives	to	reduce
immigration.	And	that	seems	unlikely	because	the	Tories	own	the	immigration	issue.
Everyone	understands	what	ownership	here	means,	even	if	they	didn’t	know	the	jargon:	a	longstanding	association
between	a	party	and	an	issue	(as,	for	example,	Labour	has	with	the	NHS)	such	that	voters	for	whom	it	is	the	top
priority	are	much	more	likely	to	support	that	party.	Admittedly,	the	Tories’	grip	on	immigration	loosened	over	recent
years,	but	it	was	UKIP	who	threatened	to	take	it	from	them.		This	only	underlines	how	different	Labour’s	stance
would	need	to	be	in	order	to	win	over	the	voters	most	opposed	to	a	Norway	option.	Labour	MPs	don’t	want	that	sort
of	policy	or	rhetoric,	and	anti-immigration	voters	know	that	they	don’t	want	it.
Hence,	whatever	else	Labour’s	‘constructive	ambiguity’	in	the	2017	election	gained	them,	it	was	not	voters	for	whom
immigration	was	the	most	important	issue	(who	voted	Conservative	over	Labour	in	a	ratio	of	over	3	to	1).	Nor	was	it
many	of	those	for	whom,	in	the	Brexit	shake-up,	controlling	immigration	matters	more	than	staying	in	the	single
market.	In	short,	the	right’s	ownership	of	the	immigration	issue	means	that	Labour	doesn’t	have	much	to	lose	from
the	Norway	option.
3.	 The	valence	dimension
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Does	it	have	much	to	gain?		Yes,	potentially,	when	we	bear	in	mind	that	most	issues	have	a	valence	(or
performance)	as	well	as	a	positional	component.	In	other	words,	even	on	issues	as	hotly	contested	as	Brexit,	some
voters	care	less	about	precisely	what	the	parties	want	and	more	about	whether	they	seem	remotely	capable	of
achieving	it.	This	is	particularly	true	of	the	median	voter	and	his	or	her	neighbours,	who	are	by	definition	less
opinionated	one	way	or	the	other	than	those	at	the	extremes.	(It	is	also	true,	for	similar	reasons,	of	those	who	did	not
vote	in	that	referendum	but	might	in	an	election.)
Given	that	they	don’t	do	the	negotiating,	Labour	cannot	really	demonstrate	capability	and	competence	here	–	they
can	only	project	them.	Party	unity	around	a	clear	position	would	go	a	long	way	to	doing	so.		The	fact	that	the	vast
majority	of	MPs	would	actually	believe	in	that	position	can	only	help	to	project	trustworthiness	on	the	issue.	It	would
also	create	and	accentuate	a	contrast	with	the	Conservatives	in	both	unity	and	clarity.
Of	course,	there	is	no	ideal	solution	here.	Going	‘full	Norway’	would	lose	any	immediate	prospects	Labour	has	of
winning	hard	Brexit	votes.	It	can	be	attacked	as	a	‘Brexit	in	name	only’	option	(although	that	is	hard	to	square	with
Norway	having	had	its	own	hotly-contested	referendum	in	which,	in	neat	symmetry,	52%	of	its	voters	saw	enough	of
a	difference	to	reject	joining	the	EU).	And	it	has	already	proven	difficult	to	get	Messrs	Corbyn	and	McDonnell	to
swing	enthusiastically	behind	single	market	membership,	and	one	could	forgive	MPs	in	strongly	Leave-inclined	seats
for	hesitating	too.	But	electoral	research	suggests	that	there	is	much	less	to	lose	and	more	to	gain	than	Labour
thinks.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Rob	Johns	is	Professor	of	Politics	at	the	University	of	Essex	and	is	author	of	Takeover:	Explaining	the	Extraordinary
Rise	of	the	SNP.
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